The paper discusses the issue of giving direct effect in EU law to international agreements, in particular those of the WTO, taking into account current jurisprudence and prevailing as well as controversial theories on the subject. It addresses the problem on the basis of its implications for separation of powers and checks and balances in order to define justiciability of norms of international agreements, rather than based on current standard criteria of sufficient precision and reciprocity. In doing so, it seeks to offer a more sophisticated approach and practical guidance in assessing the legal status of international agreements in the legal order of the European Union, reversing the current trend towards a dual concept in EU external economic relations. * Professor of European and International Economic Law, Managing Director, World Trade Institute, and Department of Economic Law, University of Bern, Switzerland.
In this paper, 'direct effect' is used to assess whether a norm in general confers to individuals a subjective right or not. This means that a private person in a state or Union may base a claim in, and be granted relief from, the domestic courts against another private person or the state on the basis of the state's obligations under an international treaty. See e.g., T. Cottier and K. Nadakavukaren Schefer (1998), supra n. 4, at p. 91 et seq.; A. Peters (1997) , supra n. 4, at p. 18 et seq.; J. Klabbers (2003) supra n. 4, at p. 272 et seq.
profoundly informed the relationship of international and constitutional law. It continues to do so in contemporary law. 6 The same holds true for EC law. Formally shaped in terms of international law, its status in the domestic law of Member States has been at the heart of legal developments in EC law. Eventually, the four freedoms were given direct effect, from early decisions on free movement of goods since van Gend & Loos 7 in 1963 to decisions relating to free movement of capital and thus of investment in Sanz de Lera 8 in 1995. Direct effect shifted EC law from an agreement on international cooperation and concertation -very much the perception in the 1950s -to a constitution for Europe, directly relevant and empowering private actors, individuals and corporations alike, both in dealing with authorisation and with competitors. In the same vein, the doctrine of direct effect given to directives upon the lapse of the implementation period has been at the heart of reinforcing the rule of law within the law of the European Union. 9 It was accompanied by judge-made law creating obligations of state responsibility and liability of governments towards citizens wherever direct effect was not a suitable avenue for implementing the directives and provisions adopted therein. 10 Conceiving that European Community law would become the law of the land of its Members, to adopt a monist conception and to link it to the primacy of EC law has been one of the most prominent developments in 20 th century international law -effectively creating a legal order sui generis placed closer to constitutional law than the classical precepts of the body of international law of coexistence and cooperation. 11 In creating a common and internal market, the doctrine of direct effect 6 Von Bogdandy suggests that monism and dualism should cease to exist as doctrinal and theoretical notions for discussing the relationship between international law and internal law. He defines the two terms as intellectual zombies of another time, which should be laid to rest, or "deconstructed." A. Bogdandy (2008), supra n. 4, at p. 4. In conclusion, regional agreements and the multilateral trading system could not be treated more differently. Overall, the situation is one of considerable inconsistency.
The Court applies both monist and dualist concepts at the same time, depending upon the subject matter and treaty at hand. 
Explaining the Dual Standard
It is difficult to explain on its face the dual standard adopted by the European Court of Justice in dealing with domestic law and preferential agreements on the one hand and the GATT and WTO agreements on the other hand. The main traditional formal criteria -clarity and determinacy of rules -employed in order to assess whether a provision has direct effect, no longer provide a convincing and adequate answer. These correlations can also be observed in the rulings of the European Court of work under the current Doha Development Agenda since 2001 witnesses. And any compromises found are likely to require changes in domestic law.
In conclusion, different international agreements, albeit comparable in form, clarity, determinacy or vagueness of provisions, operate under very different conditions of political economy which Courts cannot ignore. These differences need to be taken into account. So far, Courts have largely failed to express them in the language of coherent judicial policies and doctrines, leaving much of the motivation unspoken and needing to be read between the lines of their rulings. Is it possible to work towards a more coherent approach, taking these differences into account? We think so by reverting to doctrines of separation of powers and of checks and balances.
Towards Coherence: The Doctrine of Separation of Powers
The application of international agreements and the doctrine of direct effect impact on different layers of governance. They affect the Member States and thus have a vertical effect. They may affect EC law and thus touch upon the powers of other organs of the
Union. The proactive doctrine of direct effect, developed by the European Court of
Justice, mainly relates to vertical separation of powers and checks and balances. The defensive and dualist policies adopted mainly operate on a horizontal level. Both, however, operate within Community law, and the question arises as to whether a more coherent, overall policy can be found which could treat both constellations on the basis of a uniform theory of direct effect.
A. Vertical Checks and Balances
The granting of direct effect to the four freedoms and of many other provisions of the Europe. 48 The inclusion and application of human rights standards in EC law has further reinforced this rationale. 49 Yet, arguments relating to separations of powers and the relationship of the judiciary and legislators are not absent. The doctrine of direct effect of free movement of goods, persons, establishment and services was originally based upon the concept of transitional periods which had elapsed and now placed the ball in the camp of the judiciary in protecting the rights of citizens. It would seem that the ability of the Court to deal with these matters was taken for granted. Explicit language expounding the ability of courts, however, can be found in relation to the principle of equal pay for men and women. 50 The Court held in Defrenne II 51 that judges are not merely able to assess de jure discrimination, but that they are also able, based upon the facts to assess This may explain why issues of separation of powers have not been predominant in such constellations.
In search for common ground for a theory of direct effect in vertical constellations, it is submitted that an implied concept of justiciability exists. In the final analysis, direct effect is granted upon an implied assessment as to whether the subject matter is suitable to be handled and decided by courts in a given constitutional framework without further legislative action. In other words, it is a matter of assessing justiciability, i.e., whether the topic is suitable for judicial assessment and thus judicial legislation. A formula of sufficient clarity and determinacy of rules fails to depict the full breadth and depth of the judicial policy implied. The broad language of fundamental freedoms as well as civil and political human rights, all given direct effect today, demonstrate that justiciability does not inherently depend upon the clear language of a provision. Instead, recourse to democratic legitimacy of obligations, shaping entitlements and the law.
B. Horizontal Checks and Balances
The to judicial power, taking into account the overall institutional balance. Indeed, an overtly activist European Court of Justice may be rapidly exposed to political pressures. It may be drawn into the limelight, and its powers reviewed in subsequent treaty revisions. For such reasons, the judicial policy of the Court, in building its longterm authority, has been a cautious one.
The same reasons also explain the denial of direct effect of WTO law, given the tensions it may create, as described above. The tradition of defining external relations as a matter of foreign policy beyond legal control further reinforces this perception.
Issues in principle are not considered justiciable when it comes to reviewing EC secondary legislation on the basis of WTO rules. In this way the Court protects itself from criticism. At the same time, it fails to contribute to the institutional balance within the EC, as the political branches enjoy virtually unlimited discretion in shaping the rights and obligations of economic operators in foreign relations. The doctrine of denying direct effect and, as a result, turning in effect towards a dualist system in current judicial policy of the European Courts fails to build upon the lessons learnt from progressively granting direct effect to EC law. It has been argued that the realms are completely different, and lessons learnt cannot be transferred from one layer of governance to another. 64 We argue below that there are differences in degree, rather than in principle, and that lessons can well be learnt from experience in constitutional and EC law. Thus, the situation should be reversed and developed. 
Towards more Coherence: Multi-layered Governance and Justiciability

A. The Theory of Multi-layered Governance
A coherent doctrine defining the relationship of international and domestic law should be built and should take into account the framework of multilayered governance emerging in the 21 st century. No other polity than that of the EU is more suitable to follow this route, as it is the main expression of multi-layered governance in legal history. 65 While perceptions of national sovereignty loom large on other continents, Western Europe has developed a remarkable system of an additional regional layer of governance, the purpose of which has been to combat protectionism, advance welfare and to counter state failures and deficiencies in doing so. The WTO system today adds law. 72 The protection of fundamental rights of EU law does not cede to public international law and thus effectively protects human in the process of globalization where adequate protection is deficient on the global level.
Realists object that the Hobbesian world is not ready for multilayered governance.
The law cannot assume similar functions in an anarchical society of States to those it assumes in domestic affairs under national constitutions. These concerns need to be taken seriously in shaping rights and obligations. There is no point in engaging in legal commitments which States will fail to honour. But these are matters of degree.
To the extent that international law is adopted, the normative system should call for compliance, including that of the Courts. Again, matters are not fundamentally different from the domestic layers. Rules are broken everywhere all the time. This is not peculiar to international law. Everywhere the law essentially relies upon trust and protection of legitimate expectations which people are entitled to and have an interest in seeing protected. The power to enforce is important, but a system solely built upon power is doomed to fail. There is no reason to draw a fundamental distinction between different types of law, of rights and obligations.
B. A Theory of Justiciability and Direct Effect
Looking at different layers of governance in a comprehensive and coherent manner inevitably has implications for the status of international law in domestic law. The position and status of rules pertaining to a superior polity in a given legal system should be dealt with consistently on the basis of similar principles. The successful delegation of powers can be equally employed in defining the provinces of the courts in international economic law. Thus, under the principle of legality, self-executing treaty provisions need to define rights and obligations; the more they impinge on liberty, the more precise such rules must be. According to the extent that this requirement is met, courts may further shape the details of the rules in the process of interpretation and application to specific facts. Otherwise, the treaty provision cannot be applied directly. Norms of a purely programmatic nature do not respond to this requirement and need to be left to implementation by the legislator. Similarly, if a norm entails substantial budgetary implications, the matter needs to be left to the political branch, and direct effect must be denied to the treaty norm. It is submitted that this philosophy should be equally applied to all layers of global economic law alike, domestic, regional and international. 76 The doctrine of justiciability will bring about nuanced results. It does not follow that all provisions of WTO will be given direct effect. In fact, the courts will find in many instances that the matter needs to be left to the political process, because the regime at issue is complex and has an extensive economic, political or fiscal impact. There are good reasons to argue that a regime for the importation of bananas is not justiciable and does not fall within the proper provinces of the Court. The same may be true for hormones and GMOs. They involve major political issues and direct effect may as a result be denied or reduced on the basis of a political question doctrine, or a limited standard of review. It is regrettable that the issue of direct effect of WTO law has been exposed in the context of these cases. It is regrettable that these cases have overshadowed other constellations which beyond the doctrine of consistent interpretation 77 are perfectly suitable for direct effect, such as procedural issues addressed in the TRIPS Agreement, for example. It is also a pity that direct effect has mainly been discussed in relation to disputes adjudicated in the WTO. The proper constellation of direct effect in any legal order does not depend upon international dispute settlement. To the contrary, it entitles and obliges courts to apply these rules in their own right, taking into account existing precedents. The matter is not linked to the implementation of specific decisions, and the particularities of the WTO dispute settlement system in itself is not an obstacle to granting direct effect to WTO rules in the context of domestic litigation. At the same time, the large body of case law in the WTO today offers considerable guidance to courts in assessing rights and obligations. It is rather a matter of training and expertise which future generations of judges and economic lawyers will hopefully have at hand. Albeit the law is far from clear, it is interesting to observe that Swiss judicial authorities have adopted a more nuanced attitude to GATT and WTO law, not fundamentally excluding direct effect.
78
Granting direct effect to a norm, finally, does not entail unlimited review. exporters who are well represented in the political process. Modulations of this kind are able to limit the harsh effects of direct effect which full review tends to produce in affecting the prerogatives of the political branches of government. The theory of justiciability allows going beyond widely used consistent interpretation and recognizing that WTO rules in principle are susceptible and accessible for direct effect.
Conclusions
Recent 
